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
27 October 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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27 October 1962

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
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1. USSR - Cuban Crisis: Khrushchev tells U Thant ships will not violate quarantine area now. (*Page i*)



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4. Cuba - Non-Bloc Reaction: No UN resolution to be offered at this time. (*Page tv*)
5. India - Communist China: Nehru proclaims state of emergency. (*Page v*)



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

27 October 1962

### DAILY BRIEF

\*USSR: Khrushchev's instructions to Soviet ships bound for Cuba to avoid temporarily the interception zone established by the US Navy is aimed at bolstering Moscow's contrast of Soviet reasonableness and peaceful intentions with US "war hysteria" and "provocative" actions. Khrushchev's move, announced in response to U Thant's 25 October appeal, is also designed to play for time and involve the US in protracted negotiations.

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Khrushchev's 24 October remarks to [redacted] were also calculated to draw the US into talks on Cuba. He indicated that a personal meeting with the President was preferable to a UN appearance for the purpose of negotiating a Cuban settlement. He suggested a meeting in Moscow, Washington, or a rendezvous at sea.

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To point up the fruitfulness of negotiations, Khrushchev remarked that he was "very pleased" with the progress of the Gromyko-Rusk talks on Berlin prior to 22 October. Consistent with current Soviet practice, he made no threats of retaliation in Berlin for US actions with respect to Cuba. Moscow radio on 26 October went out of its way to reassure the West on Berlin. A commentary on Adenauer's recent speech on Cuba pointed out that he did not omit the West Berlin question. It noted that Adenauer stated that the US and the other Western powers will defend the city under any circumstances, "although, as is known, no danger threatens West Berlin." [redacted]

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\*Cuba Non-bloc Reaction: (The non-aligned group in the UN has scrapped its plans for sponsoring a resolution, pending the outcome of U Thant's private consultations with the United States, the USSR, and Cuba. Many delegations apparently feel that the urgency of the crisis has abated; several are obsessed with finding a "face-saving device" for the USSR; and many question the legality of the American blockade.)

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(Western European and Latin American delegations remain sympathetic to the United States position; Asian allies of the United States have expressed their support, while the neutralists have been reluctant to take any position; the Africans, who are inclined to feel that the crisis is a private dispute among the major powers, remain unpredictable.)


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27 Oct 62

DAILY BRIEF

iv

COMMUNIST CHINA-INDIA BORDER AREA



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India - Communist China: (After a period of confusion and indecision since the initial Chinese attack, Nehru has galvanized his government into action against what he terms a "virtual invasion of the whole country.")

(A state of emergency was proclaimed on 26 October, giving the government special powers in several areas of civilian life. An emergency session of Parliament has been summoned to meet on 8 November.)

(The government announced that it will form a national volunteer force to tap civilian skills in the defense effort. In a nationwide radio address Finance Minister Desai kicked off a drive to step up industrial production and introduce wartime economic measures.)

(The new emergency cabinet committee reportedly has reviewed the latest diplomatic moves. Moscow's support on 25 October of Peiping's peace proposals, already rejected by New Delhi, probably caused considerable dismay and may have forced a reappraisal of India's tactics. The New Indian ambassador to the USSR, scheduled to depart for Moscow on 2 November, reportedly has instructions to tell Khrushchev that New Delhi will be unable to resist pressures to seek military assistance from the US if the USSR does not act to persuade the Chinese to halt their aggression in the Northeast Frontier Agency (NEFA).)

(India has been unable to slow the main Chinese advance eastward along the road from Towang to the pass at Se La in NEFA. Chinese forces in this area are at division strength (10,000). The Indian defensive force probably amounts to no more than a reinforced brigade (4,000).)

(Near Walong at the eastern end of NEFA and in the Chushul area of Ladakh, Indian forces appear to have blunted the Chinese thrust, at least temporarily.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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